Introduction
Credit between firms, such as trade-related or regular credit, plays a crucial role in most economies around the world. Yet, research on inter-corporate credit continues to be hampered by a lack of direct firm-to-firm level data. 1 In this paper we break new empirical ground by investigating the reactions of the stock prices of both the issuing and receiving firms to announcements of inter-corporate loans.
Analyzing the stock price reaction to a corporate financing event can provide an immediate and comprehensive assessment of the valuation effect of such an event. Following the work by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , James (1987) , for example, studies the average price reactions of the firms' stock prices following public announcements of bank loan agreements and finds that bank loan announcements are associated with positive and statistically significant stock price reactions of almost 200 basis points (bp) in a two-day event window, while announcements of privately placed and public issues of debt generate zero or even negative stock price reactions. This result holds independently of the type of loan, the default risk, and the size of the borrower. The positive stock price reaction for a bank loan is generally interpreted as supporting the Fama (1985) argument that a bank loan provides accreditation for a firm's ability to generate a certain level of cash flows in the future. 2 Credit between firms is ubiquitous around the world, but particularly important in emerging economies where, due to weak legal enforcement of formal contracts, formal credit provided by financial institutions may be rationed. Inter-corporate lending, which in essence is a type of informal financing based on reputation and inter-firm relationships, may be less subject to rationing and may therefore support the high growth rates observed in an emerging economy like China (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) ).
Indeed, because small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may face substantial obstacles in obtaining bank credit, the Chinese government has allowed firms to obtain 1 Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2014) study U.S. firms' liquidity positions and Boissay and Gropp (2014) study defaults on payments to suppliers in France. An exception is Ellingsen, Jacobson and von Schedvin (2014) who study trade credit arrangements among 51 large suppliers and all their customers in Sweden. See also Petersen and Rajan (1997) , Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2007) , and Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2011) , among others. 2 Results in James (1987) spawned numerous other event studies. See for example Lummer and McConnell (1989) , Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992) , Best and Zhang (1993) , and Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) , among many others. Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) provide a critical review of the methodology and the extant empirical evidence.
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Qing He, Liping Lu and Steven Ongena Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China credit from other non-financial firms, with coordination by financial institutions. These inter-corporate loans, also called "entrusted loans", are playing an increasingly important role in supplying credit to firms in China. 3 Inter-corporate loans can be categorized as inter-group or intra-group loans, depending on whether lender and borrower are both affiliated with the same business group.
When the firm grants a loan to a firm outside the business group, it is called an inter-group loan. The lending firm screens and monitors the borrowing firm as well as bearing the default risk. Inter-group lending is one type of informal finance covered e.g. in Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) . The issuance of inter-group loans may convey the idea that the issuing firms are running out of worthy projects to finance, which may lead to negative market reactions for the issuing firms` stocks. 4 A firm may also lend to another firm within the same business group, which is then called an intra-group loan. These loans in effect funnel credit within the group`s internal capital market. Stein (1997) , for example, shows that an internal capital market can channel credit from less efficient projects to more efficient ones, and that the reallocation of credit within business groups is more common and important in countries with underdeveloped external capital markets. And indeed Buchuk, Larrain, Muñoz and Urzúa I. (2014) find that intra-group loans in Chile actually enhance firm investment and return and that, due to the country's strict regulation and disclosure requirements, such loans do not suffer from tunneling. 5 Thus, intra-group loans may be the outcome of an efficient credit reallocation decision within the business group, which may lead to a positive market reaction. Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) show that in India the internal capital market within business groups is a support mechanism for financially weaker firms to avoid de-3 According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), an entrusted loan is a type of loan in which the lender (i.e., the principal) extends credit to the borrower (i.e., the trustee) at specified amount, maturity, interest rate, and usage of the loan. Banks and other financial institutions only act as account managers who earn commissions but bear no default risk. Instead, the lending firm bears all the default risk. Entrusted loans amounted to 2.55 trillion RMB in 2013 (i.e ., about $400 billion) and accounted for 14.7 percent of the total amount of financing in the country. Data source: People's Bank of China. The increase in entrusted loans in 2013 was equivalent to nearly 30% of bank loans, which almost doubled the portion of 2012. The Wall Street Journal featured reports on entrusted loans in China on December 8 th , 2011, and May 1 st , 2014. 4 Similar to acquirers whose stock prices suffer from negative market reactions to M&A announcements, possibly revealing that the acquirers may have run out of worthwhile other projects to finance (Yook (2003) ). 5 The internal capital market may also come with a potential dark side, which is the expropriation of minority shareholders due to a separation of ownership and control (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) ; Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) ; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) ) and the rent seeking behavior of divisional CEOs (Scharfstein and Stein (2000) ). Fan, Jin and Zheng (2014) show the tradeoff between the negative and positive sides of the internal capital market in China, i.e., tunneling corporate resources versus alleviating credit constraints.
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BOFIT-Institute for Economies in Transition Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/ 2015 fault and thus the negative spillovers to the rest of the business group. Also, large recipients of intra-group loans have lower abnormal stock returns and operating performance in the subsequent one-and two-year period. Similarly, Khanna and Yafeh (2005) show that the internal capital market provides mutual insurance within business groups among affiliated firms in unstable periods in Japan, Korea and Thailand. As a result, the issuance of intra-group loans may signal financial distress for a group firm among the uninformed investors, which may lead to a negative market reaction.
To examine whether announcements of inter-group versus intra-group loans convey information to investors about these non-financial corporate lenders and borrowers, we hand-collected the announcements of 719 inter-corporate loans that took place between 2005 and 2012. There were 564 announcements made by the lenders and 155 by the borrowers. We find that the stock market reacts negatively to the issuance of inter-corporate loans, and positively to their receipt. For example the two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on the stocks of the lending firms amounted to (statistically significant) -42 basis points (bps), while the CARs on the stocks of the borrowing firms amounted to 91 bps.
Specifically, we find that the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries is associated with negative CAR, possibly signaling (to uninformed investors) financial distress for the group firm. Our results are consistent with firms supporting other firms in the group. Moreover, because the issuance of inter-group loans also generates negative CARs, this may again signal a lack of worthy projects to finance for the lending firms.
In contrast, the receipt of both intra-group and inter-group loans generates positive CARs, which indicates a type of certification for the borrowing firms by these nonfinancial corporate lenders. The receipt of inter-corporate loans stands in pointed contrast to Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) and Huang, Schwienbacher and Zhao (2012) for example who show that bank loan announcements in China result in negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. This may be due to banks' limited information and their wellknown soft budget problem. Hence lenders of inter-corporate loans may have better private information and be less subject to social and political pressure to subsidize low-quality firms. Thus, receiving an inter-corporate loan in China may provide a type of certification similar to that associated with the receipt of a bank loan in the U.S.
We also find that the CARs on the issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans are also associated with certain loan, counter-party, and (loan-announcing) firm variables.
These findings deepen our understanding of inter-corporate loan announcements. On the 7 Qing He, Liping Lu and Steven Ongena Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China one hand, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs on loans with high interest rate spreads, on intra-group loans, and on loans to firms with higher market-tobook ratios and larger amounts of other accounts receivable (i.e., larger amounts of outstanding inter-corporate lending). On the other hand, the receipt of inter-corporate loans is associated with lower CARs on loans with a higher interest rate spreads, loans from stateowned lenders, and loans to non-state controlled borrowers. The results support the hypothesis that the issuance of inter-corporate loans signals (to uninformed investors) a lack of worthwhile projects to finance for the issuing firms, while the issuance of intra-group loans conveys additional information of financial distress for the group firm.
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, we provide a novel result on the market reaction to announcements of inter-corporate loans, which extends the literature on information production by non-financial firms as creditors along side banks and non-bank financial institutions (Best and Zhang (1993) ; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) ). We show that the receipt of inter-corporate loans from non-financial firms is associated with positive market reactions, which indicates a certification effect by these non-financial firms as creditors. Secondly, our study is also related with the literature on the internal capital market of business groups (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007); Stein (1997) ). We show that the issuance of inter-corporate loans by a listed firm to another firm within the same business group is associated with negative market reactions, which indicates that the uninformed investors perceive the use of the internal capital market as a signal of rescuing distressed group firms, and that the lending firm is running out of worthy projects to finance. Finally, our findings shed light on informal finance (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) ). We show that the issuance of inter-corporate loans to firms outside the business group (i.e. informal loans) is associated with weakly negative market reactions, which indicates that uninformed investors perceive these informal loans as unfavorable investments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Chinese financial system. Section 3 sets out our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the data and methodology. Section 5 provides summary statistics and event studies of the issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans. Section 6 links CARs to a set of loan, counter-party and firm-specific characteristics and describes the post-performance of inter-corporate loan announcements. Section 7 concludes. Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/ 2015 2
The financial system in China
In China, the formal financial sector is dominated by banks (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) ), which is reflected in a bank credit to GDP ratio (1.11) that is substantially higher than the average ratio for the other countries in their sample (0.73). According to National Bureau in China, which is much lower than the U.S. Despite its rapid growth, the stock market does not play a proper role in the country, where insider trading and speculation are prevalent (He and Rui (2014) ). For example, the turnover rates on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges are 178.50 and 344.30 percent, respectively, which is higher than most industrial countries and may indicate widespread speculative trading (Allen, Qian, Zhang and Zhao (2013)). Moreover, the two stock exchanges were established so as to provide a new source of funding to SOEs and to reduce the financial burden of government bailouts.
Up until 2005, about 80 percent of the (more than 1,100) listed enterprises were converted from SOEs in China. The Chinese government's dual role as both regulators and shareholders reduces the effectiveness of the stock market in terms of resource allocation and risk diversification.
Informal financing, which has been growing rapidly in China (due to the current financial repression), channels credit from state-owned and large private firms to SMEs in 9 Qing He, Liping Lu and Steven Ongena
Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China support of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy (Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) ; Bose (1998)). The formal financial sector is inefficient in allocating credit due to a severe information asymmetry and weak law enforcement. Informal financing based on reputation and relationship may be filling the gap thanks to an advantage in screening, monitoring, and enforcement (Stiglitz (1990) ; Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) ).
One type of informal financing is the inter-corporate loan. Because direct lending activities among non-financial firms are prohibited in China, entrusted loans have moved in to facilitate inter-corporate lending. 6 Under financial regulations in China, non-financial firms can extend credit to other firms via entrusted loans in a process that is coordinated by banks and other financial institutions (banks hereafter). Lenders and borrowers can negotiate loan terms subject to certain financial regulations 7 regarding e.g. amount, interest rate, maturity, and purpose. Banks merely act as agents on behalf of the lenders and coordinate the loan procedures, i.e., the contract signing, loan withdrawals, and repayment. However, banks do not bear any default risk for the entrusted loans, which are often treated as offbalance sheet items. Appendix 1 gives a timeline for the related laws and regulations (for what we will henceforth call inter-corporate loans).
The Chinese financial authorities imposed only a mild set of regulations on entrusted loans because of their beneficial effect on credit reallocation. The market for entrusted loans has witnessed a rapid expansion with a gradual liberalization of interest rates in China, and it has recently become a key source of financing. 8 The interest rate ceiling for entrusted loans was abolished by PBOC in October 2004, which enabled lenders to negotiate freely with borrowers on interest rates. Appendix 2 shows that the market share of inter-corporate loans has been growing rapidly, accounting for 14.70 percent of total fi-6 On March 8 th , 1993, People's Bank of China (PBOC) promulgated administrative decrees on entrusted loans as regards financial trust companies. On April 5 th , 2001, the PBOC released a regulation on entrusted loans, "Issues on Commercial Banks' Provision for Launching Entrusted Loans". For an overview of the evolution of financial regulation of entrusted loans in China, see Appendix 1 for a survey of the laws relating to entrusted loans. 7 Lending General Provisions by the People's Bank of China were formulated in accord with the Law of the Commercial Banks and other relevant laws on August 1 st , 1996. Article 7 states that entrusted loans should comply with the Lending General Provisions. 8 The interest rates are under extensive regulation by the People's Bank of China (PBOC). PBOC set the benchmark interest rate along with a rate floor and rate ceiling. The interest rate is only allowed to vary within specified bounds. For example, PBOC set the benchmark lending rates, and the interest rate of commercial loans, including entrusted loans, must be between the floor and ceiling around the benchmark lending rate. China began its interest rate liberalization in 1996 by abolishing the ceiling on interbank lending rates. From 1998 to 2004, the ceiling for the lending rates gradually raised, and was abolished in October 2004 (except for credit cooperatives), while the floor remained unchanged at 90% of the benchmark lending rate. Recently, China took a further step toward a market-oriented rate by removing the lending rate floor on July 19 th , 2013. Bank of Finland BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/ 2015 nancing in 2013 (the second largest financing source after bank lending) and totaling 2.55 trillion RMB.
The rapid growth in entrusted lending has however generated substantial concern about the credit risks involved, especially in light of the gloomy prospects for the Chinese economy since the global financial crisis. SOEs and large private firms often have very limited investment opportunities (as they struggle with inefficient organizational structures, policy burdens, and overcapacity problems) but still have easy access to bank credit. This abundant credit can be channeled to private SMEs at interest rates above the bank lending rate. 9 However, inter-corporate loans may also be extended to poor borrowers if lenders do not conduct proper screening and monitoring: e.g., 27.52 percent of outstanding intercorporate lending by the Sunny Loan Top Co., Ltd as at end-2013 could not be recovered at maturity. 10 The risks of inter-corporate lending can increase the systemic risks of the financial system as such credit often ends up in the real estate market and local municipal government investment platforms, which have become a major concern as regards financial stability in China.
Although inter-corporate loans have come under substantial scrutiny in China itself, the gains and losses from such loans have not been assessed yet in the academic literature. We will provide such an evaluation by examining the market reactions to the announcements of issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans.
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The hypotheses
Institutional lenders, such as banks, can enhance firm valuation by alleviating the information asymmetry of borrowers (Fama (1985) ; Boot (2000) ; Ongena and Smith (2000) ).
Approval of a bank loan is often perceived by uninformed investors as a good signal, especially for borrowers who suffer from severe information asymmetries. The positive excess returns on borrowers` stocks following bank loan announcements are widely documented 9 Beijing, June 25 th , 2013 (Reuters) -A deputy general manager in a state-owned steel firm says that the firm doesn't use the bank credit to expand production, as the average loss is 100 -200 RMB per ton of steel sold. Entrusted loans are an attractive business option for his company. The firm borrows from banks at the benchmark lending rate (about six percent), and issues entrusted loans to borrowers at twice that rate. 10 The firm is listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange (i.e. stock ID: 600830). Among the 1.12 billion RMB entrusted loans outstanding at the end of 2013, 306 million is classified as doubtful and 5 million is classified as losses. Data from the announcement by the Sunny Loan Top Co., Ltd: www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2014-06-07/64111840.PDF.
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Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China in the literature. For example, James (1987) finds positive CARs of almost 200 basis points in a two-day period surrounding bank loan announcements. Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) show significant positive CARs on loans from non-bank financial institutions which are indistinguishable from bank loans. However, Lummer and McConnell (1989) show that the market reacts positively to loan renewals but not to new bank loan agreements.
The CARs on bank loan announcements are higher for borrowers who suffer more from information asymmetries (Best and Zhang (1993) ), e.g., for the smallest borrowers (Maskara and Mullineaux (2011) ). Lender identification can also alleviate the information asymmetry of bank loan agreements, as in the case of internationally syndicated loans in emerging economies (Harvey, Lins and Roper (2004) ), and loans by foreign or local banks, except for domestic banks that are located far from their borrowers (Ongena and Roscovan (2013) ) and lenders with higher credit ratings (Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) ).
However, the CARs on bank loan announcements change over time. Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) for example show that CARs on bank loan announcements were positive in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas they disappeared afterwards except for smaller and poorly performing firms and periods of high credit risk spreads. And Li and Ongena (2014) find that the CARs on bank loan announcements were positive during the global financial crisis although they were close to zero before that. Wang and Xia (2014) show that banks exert less effort in ex-ante screening and ex-post monitoring when they can securitize loans, which may explain the changes in CARs on bank loans over the time.
Despite considerable anecdotal evidence, little direct evidence has been provided so far on the market reactions of lenders' stocks to loan announcements. A few studies investigate the loan announcement effect of lending financial institutions. For example, Megginson, Poulsen and Sinkey (1995) show that the announcements of syndicated loans to Latin American borrowers in the 1970s are associated with negative CARs for the lending banks, while syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers in the 1980s are associated with positive CARs. However, little is known about the announcement effect of loans made by nonfinancial firms. Yook (2003) show that the acquirers' stock prices suffer from negative market reactions to M&A announcements, which may be seen to indicate that the acquirers have run out of other worthwhile projects to finance. Similarly, the issuance of intercorporate loans may suggest that the issuing firms have run out of worthy investment projects, which can lead to negative market reactions. Thus, our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The announcement of the issuance of an inter-corporate loan will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of the issuing firm.
In contrast to bank loans, the granters of inter-corporate loans are non-financial firms, and loan default risks should incentivize them to acquire proprietary information about the borrowers, e.g., through long-term business relationships such as business group affiliation, supplier-customer, etc. Thus, obtaining an inter-corporate loan may certify the borrower and convey positive information to uninformed investors. Thus, our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The announcement of the receipt of an inter-corporate loan will lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of the receiving firm.
Business groups are prevalent in emerging economies (Claessens, Fan and Lang (2006) 
where weak creditor protection may make it too costly to raise external finance (Bae and Vidhan (2009)). Firms with good investment opportunities can obtain credit through the internal capital market if and when the headquarters of the business group allocates credit efficiently among group firms (Stein (1997) ). But the headquarters of the group may also channel credit to other group firms in financial distress in order to avoid negative spillovers to the rest of the business group (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) ).
Ownership is often concentrated in business groups, and voting rights exceed cash flow rights through pyramid structures and cross-holdings by controlling shareholders in emerging economies (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) ). Thus, a majority of decision rights are often in the hands of controlling shareholders, which may enable them to tunnel corporate resources for private benefits (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000)). For example, controlling shareholders used to tunnel resources away from listed firms through intra-group loans in China (Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010) ). However, intragroup loans to controlling shareholders have been prohibited by the Chinese government since 2006, which alleviates the tunneling concerns with respect to inter-corporate loans in the country. As a result, intra-group loans among Chinese listed firms are likely reveal a lack of worthwhile projects and financial distress rather than tunneling.
The receipt of intra-group loans, however, resembles bank loan agreements though the lenders are affiliated within the same business group. Firms may have proprietary information due to affiliation within the same business group. Thus, our third and fourth hypotheses: Hypothesis 3: The announcement of the issuance of an intra-group loan will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of the issuing firm.
Hypothesis 4:
The announcement of the receipt of an intra-group loan will lead to significantly positive excess returns on the stock of the receiving firm.
Inter-group loans are extended by one non-financial firm to another not in the same business group. But inter-group loans often occur between firms with certain business relationships, e.g., customers, suppliers, or firms in the same industry. Lending firms may have an informational advantage over banks in screening and monitoring the borrowers when extending inter-corporate loans. In addition, lenders can benefit from inter-group loans via a higher rate of return than in alternative investments (e.g., bank deposits). What is even more important is that inter-group loans provide an alternative financing channel for credit constrained borrowers such as private SMEs.
Lenders of inter-group loans, especially SOEs and large private firms, can raise external finance more easily than private SMEs. The issuance of inter-group loans may signal to uninformed investors that the issuing firms have run out of worthwhile projects to finance, even though the inter-corporate loans indeed improve the credit allocation in the issuing firms as in Bose (1998) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1997) . We surmise that the signaling effect dominates the credit reallocation effect, which results in a negative market reaction to the issuance of inter-group loans.
The receipt of inter-group loans, however, is also quite similar to the receipt of bank loans. Although the lenders are non-financial firms, which may lack sufficient expertise in lending, they may have proprietary information obtained through long-term business relationship (e.g., suppliers or customers). Thus, our fifth and sixth hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: The announcement of the issuance of an inter-group loan will lead to significantly negative excess returns on the stock of the issuing firm. (2010)).
The CSRC requires all listed firms to announce major events which may influence their stock prices. 11 We then crosscheck the announcements with the official documents of corporate announcements published on the websites designated by the CSRC, 12 is further broken down into controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and firms with other relationships (i.e., firms affiliated with the same business group but without equity ownership of each other), and ownership of the counter-party. In addition, we also record whether an inter-corporate loan is a new loan (issuance / receipt) or a loan revision. A new loan indicates that the borrower and lender do not have a prior inter-corporate loan between them, while a loan revision means there is an existing loan. The announcement files for inter-corporate loans enable us to identify loan terms such as the loan amount, interest rate, maturity, and collateral, and also the name of the financial institution involved, among other characteristics.
The inter-corporate loan announcements are matched with stock prices and a set of firm characteristics at the fiscal year-end before the announcement year. We collect financial information for non-listed firms from the announcement files of inter-corporate loans, and also from the survey of industrial firms by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 13 As a result, we can compile a set of firm characteristics which may be associated with the CARs on announcements of inter-corporate loans.
Methodology
A standard market model (as in Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) for example) is used to estimate the benchmark returns and then to calculate the abnormal returns.
In order to measure market returns, we use the equally-weighted market return for the Chinese stock market (A-shares) from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. We define the announcement date as the event date (i.e., "day 0"). For each "clean" announcement of entrusted loans, we run a daily market model for the firms over the estimation window of [-250, -21] . Specifically, The abnormal return for firm i on day t is defined as:
where is the rate of return for firm i on day t, is the rate of return for the equallyweighted market index of the Chinese stock market (A-shares) on day t. The coefficients and are estimates of firm i's market model parameters for the period from 250 trading days to 21 trading days before the event date.
The average abnormal return on event day t for a sample of size N is:
The significance tests are based on standardized abnormal returns:
and 2 is the residual variance of the market model for firm ; is the number of days used in the market model regression (230); is the average market return over the estimation window. If individual abnormal returns follow a normal distribution, will follow a Student's t-distribution with − 2 degrees of freedom.
Cumulative abnormal returns, i.e., [ 1 , 2 ] , are the summation of abnormal returns over the event window [ 1 , 2 ] for firm i, the average CAR for a sample size is:
The statistic for the significance test of [ 1 , 2 ] is:
Since December 16, 1996, the Chinese stock market has imposed restrictions on the daily price ceiling and floor. Based on the previous trading day's closing price, the ceiling and the floor for the stock prices are set at ten percent for all stocks and five percent for stocks that are labeled for special treatment ("ST"). 14 Thus, the stock price may continue to react Qing He, Liping Lu and Steven Ongena
Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China after the announcement day, which makes CAR[-1, +1] an informative measure to capture a full market reaction besides the standard CAR [-1,0] . We also report results for various event windows (e.g., CAR[-2,+2]) to check the robustness of the estimates.
Finally we link the CARs to a certain loan, counter-party and firm characteristics in a regression equation: financial fraud, the company has failed to take remedial action within a specified period after being urged by the CSRC to do so, and the company has been temporarily delisted for two months; (4) The company has failed to issue its annual report or semi-annual report on the designated date and has been temporarily delisted for two months. Any company that fails to take steps to improve its situation after being designated ST will ultimately be delisted from the stock exchange. Bank of Finland 
Results

Summary statistics
We Loan size is the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Maturity is the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise. Loan revision equals one if the loan terms are revised, zero otherwise. The test of mean difference between issuance and receipt reports the tstatistics with significance *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level. Table 2 also shows that the maturity is 18.22 months on average for the issuance of intragroup loans and 12.24 months for the issuance of inter-group loans. The maturity for the receipt of inter-corporate loans is slightly longer than that for inter-group loans. In addition, the average interest rate spread is 14 versus 115 percent over the basis lending rate for the issuance of intra-group versus inter-group loans; and four versus seventeen percent for the receipt of intra-group versus inter-group loans. Furthermore, the issuance of intragroup loans has a lower proportion of guarantees than inter-group loans (i.e., thirteen versus 66 percent), which also applies to the receipt of intra-group versus inter-group loans (i.e. nine versus 40 percent).
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Market reactions to the issuance of inter-corporate loans
The top panel of Table 3 shows Inter-corporate loans are classed as single-events if there is a single announcement for issuing a loan on the same date, and vice versa for multiple-events. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test report the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
As multiple inter-corporate loan issuances may be announced on a single day, we split the sample into single-event versus multiple-events subsamples in order to get a cleaner effect.
Thus, the middle panel of Table 3 shows that the CAR[-1,0] is -0.48 percent and statistically significant for the single-event subsample in a t-test, and -0.17 percent and insignifi- Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China cant for the multiple-events subsample. We will focus on the single-event subsample for the issuance of inter-corporate loans hereafter. Table 4 shows the issuance of inter-corporate loans by intra-group versus intergroup loans. The CAR[-1,0] for the issuance of intra-group loans is -0.62 percent and significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon singed-rank test, while it is -0.25 percent for inter-group loans and significant at one percent level in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test although statistically insignificant in a t-test. Furthermore, the results for AR[0] and CAR[-1,-1] are qualitatively similar. In sum, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates a negative market reaction, sending unfavorable signals to uninformed investors for both intra-group and inter-group loans. The issuance of inter-corporate loans may reveal a credit misallocation in a listed firm, e.g., a listed firm may run out of worthwhile projects to finance even when the inter-corporate loans may enhance the credit allocation. Inter-corporate loans are in the intra-group borrowers subsample if the borrowers are in the same business group, and vice versa for the inter-group borrowers subsample. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
We also show the CARs separated into issuance of intra-group loans to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationship. Besides indicating a lack of worthwhile projects in the issuing firm, the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries may also reveal financial distress in this subsidiary, which may spill over to the rest of the business group. Our results provide evidence consistent with the role of ICMs in supporting financially weaker firms in a business group (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) ). Intra-group loans are in subsamples according to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationships. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
In sum, the negative CARs for the issuance of inter-corporate loans may reveal a credit misallocation to the uninformed investors, or rather a lack of worthwhile projects to fi- Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China nance for the issuing firms, even when such loans would improve credit allocation. Furthermore, the negative CARs for the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries may reveal financial distress in the subsidiary which may spill over to the rest of the business group. The negative CARs for the issuance of inter-group loans, however, may also show inefficient informal loans, i.e., non-financial corporate lenders may lack sufficient lending expertise as banks.
5.3
Market reactions to the receipt of inter-corporate loans Inter-corporate loans are classed as single-events if there is a single announcement of a loan receipt on the same date, and as multiple-events if there are multiple announcements of loan receipts on the same date. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level. -2,2] . We find that the intra-group loans also have a certification effect for the borrowing firms, which may be due to their proprietary information due to affiliation with the same business group. Inter-corporate loans are in the intra-group lenders subsample if the lenders are in the same business group, and as inter-group lenders if the lenders are not in the same business group. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
We also tabulate the receipts of intra-group loans by those from controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and lenders with other relationships. Who gains from credit granted between firms? Evidence from inter-corporate loan announcements Made in China significant at the one percent level in both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Furthermore, the receipt of intra-group loans from lenders with other relationship has a CAR[-1,0] of 0.37 percent (but not statistically significant). However, we do not find any clear evidence for the receipt of intra-group loans from subsidiaries, likely due to the limited number of observations. Intra-group loans are in subsamples according to controlling shareholders, subsidiaries, and borrowers with other relationship. The t-test of the CARs reports the t-statistic, and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test reports the proportion of positive CARs. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
In sum, the receipt of inter-corporate loans may provide certification for the borrowing firms. In particular, the receipt of loans from controlling shareholders' can provide proprietary information to uninformed investors, which leads to positive CARs. The intra-group loan from controlling shareholders is consistent with the corporate propping-up by controlling shareholders in emerging markets (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) ; Jian and Wong (2010); Peng, Wei and Yang (2011)). Loan size is the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Maturity is the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Counter-party ownership is the ownership of the controlling shareholder in a loan-announcing firm, or the ownership of a loan-announcing firm's subsidiary; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-party and loan-announcing firm are in the same industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-party is state-owned, zero otherwise; Firm size is the logarithm of the total assets; Age is the number of years listed on the stock exchanges; Sales growth is the annual sales growth rate; Market to book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; ROA is the return on assets; Cash holding is cash over total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash flow over total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equal one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts payable is the other accounts payable over total assets. The t-test of the CAR difference between subsamples reports the t-statistics with significance *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level. CARs and loan, counter-party and firm characteristics
We tabulate CARs in terms of sample median and by loan type, counter-party and firm characteristics in Table 9 . The issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries generates higher CARs for loans with a guarantee, and lower CARs for loan revisions, and also lower CARs for those where the issuers have higher other accounts receivable (i.e., more intercorporate loans outstanding). For the receipt of intra-group loans from controlling shareholders, the CARs are higher when the receiving firms have higher ROAs and lower free cash flow.
We also regress the CARs on loan, counter-party, and firm level variables according to equation (7). Firstly, we include loan variables, i.e., loan size, spread of the interest rate over basis lending rate, maturity, guarantee status (whether a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by third-parties), loan revision (whether a loan announcement relates to a revision of loan terms). We also include a set of counter-party variables, i.e., intra-group versus inter-group loans, whether the counter-party and the listed firm are in the same industry, counter-party size, and whether the counter-party is state-owned, etc. Finally, we include a set of firm level variables, i.e., firm size, age, market-to-book ratio, free cash flow, receipt of inter-corporate loans are more likely to be larger, more mature, state-controlled, and have higher leverage ratio, and higher other accounts payable (i.e., higher intercorporate loans receipts in the past). Table 10 shows the regressions of CAR [-1,0] for the issuance and receipt of intercorporate loans on the loan, counter-party and firm characteristics. Models (1) to (3) of Table 10 give the estimates for the issuance, and Models (4) to (6) for the receipt of intercorporate loans.
Model (1) of Table 10 shows that the CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans are negatively associated with the interest rate spread over the basis lending rate.
Model (2) shows that the CARs on the issuance of intra-group loans to subsidiaries are lower for intra-group loans, which may be due to a signaling effect as to the financial distress of a group firm. Specifically, intra-group loans to subsidiaries at a higher interest rate may reveal a high default risk in these subsidiaries, which could spill over to the rest of the business group.
Model (3) of Table 10 shows that the more mature firms in the stock market generate higher CARs on the issuance of inter-corporate loans, as the uninformed investors may be less concerned about default risks for the borrowing subsidiaries. Furthermore, firms with higher market-to-book ratios have lower CARs due to more severe credit misallocation in the fast-growing firms. In other words, an issuance of an inter-corporate loan by a firm with higher growth prospects may provide more valuable proprietary information to the uninformed investors on a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firm.
Finally, the CARs are lower for issuers with higher other accounts receivable, i.e., the issuing firms already have substantial issuances of inter-corporate loans outstanding, which may further confirm credit misallocation in the issuing firm, and financial distress in a group firm. The dependent variable is the CAR[-1,0] in percentage points. Log loan size is the logarithm of the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Log maturity is the logarithm of the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises the previous loan terms, zero otherwise; Intra-group loan equals one if the counter-party is in a same business group, zero otherwise; Counter-party industry equals one if the counter-party and loanannouncing firm are in the same industry, zero otherwise; Counter-party size is the logarithm of total assets of the counter-party; State-owned counter-party equals one if the counter-party is state-owned, zero other-wise; Firm size is the logarithm of total assets; Age is the number of years listed in the stock exchanges; Market to book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities scaled by the book value of total assets; Free cash flow is the free cash flow over total assets; Leverage is the total liabilities over total assets; State-control equals one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-owned, zero otherwise; Other accounts receivable is the other accounts receivable over total assets; Other accounts payable is the other accounts payable over total assets. Industry and year dummies are included and the coefficients are omitted.
Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance is indicated as *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
Model (4) of Table 10 shows the regression results for CARs on the receipt of intercorporate loans on loan variables, with no variables being statistically significant. The CARs are lower for loans with higher interest rate spreads, and these are significant at the ten percent level when we control for counter-party variables in Model (5) (6) of Table 10 . Our results are generally consistent with the bank loan announcement literature in that certification is more effective if given by more credit-worthy lenders (Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) ), and also more effective for poorly performing borrowers (Fields, Fraser, Berry and Byers (2006) ).
We also examine the loan-announcing firms' accounting performance after the inter-corporate loan announcements. If the issuance of inter-corporate loans reveals credit misallocation in the issuing firms or financial distress in a group firm, we would expect the post-performance to turn worse after the issuance of inter-corporate loans. In contrast, if the receipt of inter-corporate loans provides certification for the receiving firms, we would expect a stronger higher post-performance after the receipt of inter-corporate loans. Table   11 shows the return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) adjusted by the industry median in the years before, during, and after the announcement. We find that the ROA and ROE indeed decline after issuing inter-corporate loans, which shows that the issuance of inter-corporate loans indicates a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms, or financial distress in a group firm. However, we do not find any significant change in the ROA / ROE after receipt of inter-corporate loans, which shows that the uninformed investors may not have the necessary sophistication to interpret the receipt of inter-corporate loans in China. In sum, we find that the CARs on issuance and receipt of inter-corporate loans are associated with various loan, counter-party, and (loan-announcing) firm variables. On the one hand, the issuance of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs for loans with wide in-terest rate spreads, for intra-group loans, for firms with a higher market-to-book ratios, and with higher other accounts receivable (i.e., higher issuances of inter-corporate loans outstanding). On the other hand, the receipt of inter-corporate loans generates lower CARs for the loans with a higher interest rate spread, loans from state-owned lenders, and loans to non-state controlled borrowers. The results support the hypothesis that the issuance of inter-corporate loans signals to uninformed investors a lack of worthwhile projects to finance in the issuing firms, while the issuance of intra-group loans conveys additional information of financial distress in a group firm.
Conclusion
The granting of entrusted loans in China provides us with a unique setting to evaluate the valuation effects of inter-corporate lending and borrowing. We find that investors react negatively to the issuance of inter-corporate loans but positively to their receipt. The issuing of inter-corporate loans may indicate credit misallocation to uninformed investors, i.e., the issuing firms run out of worthy projects to finance. Furthermore, the issuance of intercorporate loans to subsidiaries may reveal financial distress in that subsidiary, which may eventually spill over to the rest of the business group.
On the other hand, the receipt of intra-group loans, especially those from controlling shareholders, provides certification for the borrowing firms. In contrast to bank loan announcements, which often provoke negative market reactions (Bailey, Huang and Yang (2011) ), non-financial corporate lenders in China can convey proprietary information to the uninformed investors.
We also confirm our results by linking the CARs to loan, counter-party, and firm level variables. Loan size is the amount of inter-corporate loans in millions of RMB; Maturity is the loan maturity in number of months; Spread is the percentage increase in the interest rate from the basis lending rate; Guarantee equals one if a loan is collateralized or guaranteed by a third party, zero otherwise; Loan revision equals one if a loan revises previous loan terms, zero otherwise. The t-test of mean difference between issuance and receipt reports the t-statistic with significance *** at one percent, ** at five percent, and * at ten percent level.
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